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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MORRIS MYERS and 
PEGGY A. MYERS, 
v. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
HOWARD R. MORGAN and 
DAVID T. GREEN, 
Defendants-
Appellant. 
: 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
No. 16991 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On July 21, 1980, Plaintiffs-Respondents filed with this 
Court a brief responding to Appellant's arguments on appeal and 
also purporting to set forth a cross-appeal. This filing by 
respondents occured ninety-four days after the record on appeal 
was designated on April 18, 1980: ninety-one days after 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal was denied on 
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April 21, 1980; and seventy-five days after Plaintiffs-
Respondents' Motion for Summary Affirmance was denied on May 7, 
1980. Defendant-Appellant now respectfully submits this short 
Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 75(p) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT. AND AUTHORITY 
I I. PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS' CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
A. Respondents' Cross-Appeal is Untimely. 
In their brief filed with this Court on July 21, 
1980, Plaintiffs-Respondents purport to set forth a "cross-
appeal". Black's Law Dictiohary (1968) defines a "cross-appeal": 
Where both parties to a judgment appeal1 
therefrom, the appeal of each is called a 
'cross-appeal' as regards that of the other 
(emphasis added). 
Id. at 124. Rule 74(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
recognizes cross-appeals and provides: 
lRule 75(p) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
in pertinent part: 
Within one month after the record on appeal is 
filed in supreme court, unless a motion to dismiss 
the appeal has been interposed, in which event 
within twenty days from the denial of such motion, 
the Appellant shall file with the clerk of the 
Supreme Court not less than ten copies of his 
brief on appeal, and shall serve upon the imposing 
party not less than two copies of such brief 
• • • (emphasis added). 
-2-
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Where any ••• part[y] ha[s] filed a notice of 
appeal as required by Rule 73, other parties may 
separately • • • cross-appeal from the order or 
judgment of the lower court without filing a 
notice of appeal; provided, however, such party 
.•. shall file a statement of the points on 
which he intends to rely on such cross-appeal 
within the time and as required by subdivision (d) 
of Rule 75. (emphasis added) 
The requirements referred to in Rule 75(d) are as follows; 
If the Respondent desires to cross-appeal, • . . 
the Respondent shall, within ten days after the 
service and filing of Appellant's designation, OR 
if the parties stipulate as to the record on 
appeal, within ten days from the filing of such 
stipulation, serve and file a statement of 
Respondent's points, either by way of such 
cross-appeal or for the purpose of having 
considered other additional matters than those 
raised by appellant. (emphasis added) 
Whether Plaintiffs-Respondents had ten days from the filing of 
Appellant's Designation of Record appeal under Rule 74(b) or 
whether they had 20 days from the final denial of their last 
Motion on appeal as provided in Rule 75(b) (1), Preliminary 
Statement to this Brief. The "cross-appeal" filed by Plaintiffs-
Respondents was severely out of time and thus cannot be recognized 
by this Court under the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure. [See 
Preliminary Statement, supra]. The Utah Legislature has provided 
for orderly appeal as recommended by this Court. Compliance with 
these statutory Rules of Civil Procedure is mandatory. In re 
Martins Estate, 415 P.2d 319 (Hawaii 1966). For this reason if 
none other, Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
to dismiss the untimely cross-appeal. 
-3-
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B. The District Court Was Correct in Receiving Evidenc~ 
of Partial Payment on the Promissory Note. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents erroneously urge on cross-appeal 
that the District Court improperly admitted, heard and considered 
evidence as to partial payment of the promissory note. Cited in 
support of this contention are Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and two Utah Supreme Court cases: Bezner 
v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) and 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 375 P.2d 456 (Utah 1962). A close 
examination of these rules and cases clearly indicates the vacuity 
2 
of the cross-appeal. 
Rule 8{c) requires the pleading of "affirmative 
defenses". Each of the common law affirmative defenses set forth 
in Rule 8{c) would, if successful, completely relieve a defendant 
of liability on the claim. 3 Thus, the "payment" contemplated by 
Rule 8(c) (and the waiver provisions of Rule 12(h)) is complete 
payment in the sense of satisfaction. In the case at bar, 
defendant-Appellant Green does not claim satisfaction 
2The decisions cited by Plaintiffs-Respondents, the Bezner 
case and the Tygeson case, are wholly inapposite in that neither 
deal with the 8(c) defense of payment let alone with the factual 
question of partial payment implicit in Defendant-Appellant's 
specific denials portions of the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3This statement purposely ignores the later statutory 
modification of certain common law affirmative defenses as 
contributory negligence. 
-4-
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of the debt. Neither did the District Court analyze such a 
claimed defense. Defendant-Appellant did specifically deny in his 
Answer, however, that (a) he was liable for the amount of a 
certain promissory note: and (b) that no payments had been made 
save $100.00 on the note. These specific denials did not raise 
the affirmative defense of payment (meaning extinguishing a once 
valid debt) but rather disputed specific factual allegations made 
in Plaintiff's Complaint, (i.e.: that no payments save $100.00 
were ever made on the note.) 
The District Court correctly took to be at issue the 
question of whether any payments (and if so any in excess of 
$100.00) had been made on the alleged promissory note. The 
Court's receipt of evidence concerning partial payment and its 
finding that some payments had been received was not to test an 
8(c) defense but to rightly ascertain the factual sum allegedly 
due from defendants. This was a proper exercise of fact-finding 
judicial authority by the District Court. Such a finding has not 
been alleged to be erroneous by Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
II. THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BELOW AGAINST APPELLANT DAVID GREEN 
MUST BE REVERSED. 
A. The Judgment on Appeal Here Is for Liability 
on a Promissory Note. 
The judgment, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law 
which are on appeal before this Court set forth that David Green 
-5-
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is liable to Plaintiffs-Respondents on a promissory note. A 
review of the transcript of trial clearly shows that the District 
Court accepted no evidence nor found any facts as to an underlying 
obligation of defendant-Appellant David Green. On the contrary, 
the entire trial proceeded on the issue of whether a promissory 
note had been executed by David Green and Howard Morgan and 
whether that note had been partially paid. Thus, this Court does 
not face the "right result for the wrong reason." 
If such were the case, the logic of some decisions cited 
by Plaintiffs-Respondents would be applicable. (See, e.g., Alphin 
Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Ut. 1979); Edward v. Iron 
County, 531 P.2d 476 (Ut. 1975); Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt 
Lake City, 190 P.2d 586 (Ut. 1964) .) There are no statutes with 
one or more alternative interpretations nor are there rules of law 
with alternative justifications. None of the situtations posed in 
the cases cited by Plaintiffs-Respondents are at all helpful or on 
point with the issue facing this Court. Rather, this appeal 
confronts a District Court judgment which is clearly wrong and 
cannot, absent remand, be transformed from a judgment on a 
promissory note to a judgment on an alleged underlying debt 
obligation. 
B. The District Court Based Its Judgment Upon the 
Evidence it Received. 
The District Court found that the note had been partially 
paid and that the promissory note was a liability of both 
-6-
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defendants, even though defendant David Green had never signed th~ 
note. (See Appellant's Brief at 3.) Appellant's Petition before 
this Court is thus on the very judgment of the District Court 
itself. 
The District Court record and Findings of Fact are not 
sufficient to impose liability on Appellant David Green on any 
underlying obligation. Any such finding must be the result of 
specific evidentiary submissions, legal argument and specific 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to that point. This 
Court can affirm the lower court's decision only if it finds that 
Defendant-Appellant David Green is liable on a promissory note. 
This is legally impossible. 
C. Respondents Have Failed to Controvert the Rule of 
Law that David Green is not Liable on the September 
4, 1974 Note Because He Did Not Sign It. 
The impossibility of affirming the District Court's 
judgment arises because a party is not liabile on any instrument 
unless his name appears on the face of it. Havatampa Corp. v. 
Walton Drug Co., Inc., 354 S.2d 1235 (Fla. 1978); Wiebke v. 
Richardson & Sons, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1978); Ness v. 
Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., 517 P.2d 1278 (Ariz. 1974): Fewox v. 
Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 249 S.2d 55 (Fla. 1971); Jennaro v. 
Jennaro, 190 N.W.2d 164 (Wis. 1971): Bostwick Banking Co. v. 
Arnold, 178 S.E.2d 890 (Ga. 1970). See, also, 11 AM JUR 2d, Bills 
-7-
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and Notes § 560; § 70A-3-401{1) Utah Code Ann. It is Howard 
Morgan's signature, not that of David Green which appears 
prominately on the face of the promissory note. 
Howard Morgan alone was properly found liable on that 
note even in the face of the allegation that he was acting as 
defendant David Green's agent. An agent is solely and personally 
liable on an instrument if he does not name the principal he 
represents or show that he signed in a representative capacity. 
North Carolina National Bank v. Wallens, 230 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 
1976); Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc., 517 P.2d 1278 (Ariz. 
1974); Wolfe v. University National Bank, 310 A.2d 558 (Md. 1973); 
§ 70A-3-403(2) Utah Code Ann. 
CONCLUSION 
On the strength of the detailed legal and factual 
analysis set forth in Appellant's Brief (uncontroverted by 
Respondents), the course open to this Court is clear. David Green 
is not and cannot be liable as a party to the September 4, 1974 
note because he did not sign it. To the extent that the District 
Court's judgment differs it must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this /.Sf""aay of August, 1980. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
-8-
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Attorneys for Defendants-Appellant 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1500 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of August, 1980, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Morris and Peggy Myers 
1395 Chandler Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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